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Abstract 
In our previous articles, we have explained the distortions from the isolated implementation of corporate taxes on company’s 
investment, a condition that assumes total abstraction of the personal taxes. In this article, we included the personal taxes in 
our analysis, with intention to explore the investment decision from the shareholder’s point of view as well. With other words, 
the goal of this serial of  articles is to analyze the effects from the integrated implementation of both, the corporate and the 
personal taxes, a phenomenon commonly referred as “double taxation”. For that purpose, our basic methodology of effective 
marginal tax rates is once again modified and extended to express all the newly occurred conditions. The theory refers to many 
varieties of integrated tax systems that carry some capacities to alleviate the burden targeted exclusively on the external equity 
investments. From the wide literature, in our two previous articles we narrowed our choice to examine the proposals of the 
OECD, which included the Comprehensive Business Income Tax system (CBIT), the Allowance for Corporate Equity Tax 
system (ACE), and the Allowance for Shareholder Equity Tax system (ASE). In this article, we focus our attention specifically 
on the Full Integration Tax system (FIT), the Dividend Exemption Tax system (DET) and the Flat Tax Rate system (FTR). 
Keywords: Full Integration Tax system (FIT); Dividend Exemption Tax system (DET); Flat Tax Rate system 
(FTR); cost of capital; effective marginal tax rate; Classical Corporation Tax (CCT); debt; new equity issues; 
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1. Introduction 
In our previous articles, we have described and explained the distortions that usually arise from the isolated 
implementation of corporate taxes, a condition that assumes total abstraction of the personal taxes. In this article, 
we also include the personal taxes in our analysis, with intention to explore the investment decision, not only from 
the company’s perspective, but from the shareholder’s point of view as well. With other words, the goal is to 
analyze the effect from the integrated implementation of both, the corporate and the personal taxes, a phenomenon 
commonly referred as “double taxation”. This condition is granted to fact that the corporate tax base (i.e. the 
corporate income) cannot be limited only at the corporation observed as a form of legal entity. Usually, under the 
Classical Corporation Tax regime, after the initial taxation at corporate level, corporate profits are distributed to 
the shareholders in a form of dividends, capital gains or interest payments, and are subject to additional taxation 
at personal level.  
The ultimate consequence of the referred phenomenon is imposition of an additional “extra” burden on total 
corporate profit expressed integrally from its source to its destination. Taking in consideration that this “excessive” 
taxation of profit which is considered unfair and could distort the economic activity of firms, the authorities try to 
construct more appropriate “neutral” tax systems with attributions to effectively tax the economic rents (or the 
extra profit) and at the same time avoid taxation of the normal return. In addition, we give a brief literature review 
to some integrated models of corporate tax systems with the desired properties (capacity to alleviate the extra 
burden on corporate profits and higher degree of neutrality). The following tax systems are protagonists proposals 
of the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development), as a part of the tax reform that was 
undergone recently. According to the OECD (2007), the following tax systems are considered as neutral with 
abilities to eliminate the difference between debt and equity. Which in other hand are associated with the classical 
corporation tax: the Full Integration Tax system (FIT), the Dividend Exemption Tax system (DET), the Allowance 
for Corporate Equity tax system (ACE), the Allowance for Shareholder Equity tax system (ASE), the 
Comprehensive Business Income Tax (CBIT) etc.  
It is a commonly known truth that borrowed capital is a superior source of finance from the taxpayer’s point of 
view, because of the usual and widely excepted treatment of interest payments. In practice, since companies are 
allowed to deduct interest payments from their corporate income tax base, the system subsidizes the debt source 
finance in a manner that the action reduces the opportunity cost of the debt-financed investment. This gives a 
certain advantage to the debt finance, since it is considered as tax preferred in front of equity, which oppositely is 
fully taxed. The last triggers unfavorable behavior of the company, to use more borrowed capital, thus increasing 
the risk of bankruptcy and insolvency of the firm. The last presents the most common and typical distortion of the 
corporate finance, induced by the traditional, “classical” treatment of corporate profit. But, the leading economic 
organizations such as the OECD, have made a break-through in the sphere of business taxation, proposing some 
alternative models of hybrid tax systems, that are much or less distinct from the classical approach and have better 
capacities to allocate the burden across the different sources of finance more evenly.  
For example, the FIT system treats the corporation as a pass through entity and allocates all the corporate profit 
at shareholder level, where it is subject to taxation under the personal income tax. For the CIT already paid on 
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distributed profits, the stockholders will be granted with a tax credit in amount of the tax liabilities paid at 
corporate level. As a result, tax treatment between debt and equity will be ultimately equalized. Another great 
example is the CBIT system. This regime successfully eliminates the need for integration between the corporate 
and personal taxes on equity by imposing restriction on the possibility to deduct the interest payments. In fact, 
interest income is no longer deductible from the corporate income tax base and at the same time is exempt from 
taxation at personal level. The result is neutrality and indifference between debt and equity. Also, the ACE system 
represents an appropriate solution against the induced distortion on the corporate finance. With the ACE system, 
companies are allowed to deduct a normal return on equity from the corporate income tax base, which is usually 
equal to the nominal interest rate, providing an equal, parallel „symmetric“ treatment of  debt and equity. 
Differently to the ACE, the ASE allows to the entity to deduct a tax-deductible allowance for the normal return, 
this time on the shareholder capital income tax base, not on the corporate income tax base, thus establishing 
neutrality among the alternative finance. Similar effects are determined within the other tax systems mentioned 
above (OECD, 2007).  
In this article, we focus our attention specifically on the integrated effects from corporate and personal taxes on 
company’s investment financed exclusively with new equity issues (external equity). As we know from business 
practice, equities could be found in 2 (two) fundamental forms: external equity (new equity issues), which 
provides the equity capital for the ongoing projects externally, through issues of the company’s shares on the 
capital market; and retained earnings (retentions of profit), which are formed from the company’s accumulated 
(non-distributed) profit and are usually subject of reinvestment. The models of taxation discussed in this article, 
could be easily applied in the investment scenario covered with retained earnings as well, of course modified with 
its specific circumstances. With the purpose to achieve more detailed, systematic approach in exploration of the 
attributions and specificities of the models, we decided to study them separately, and dedicate this article only for 
the new equity finance. Other reasons for this are the limited space, minimizing the risk for confusion, and 
providing a better comparison of the effects. The basic methodology is consisted of the effective marginal tax 
rates analytical frame (EMTR), which is additionally modified and extended to express all the newly occurred 
conditions that define “double” taxation of corporate profit. With the adapted methodology of EMTR, we have 
managed to identify and explain many varieties of integrated tax systems. Here, we present in detail the effects 
from the Full Integration Tax system (FIT), Dividend Integration Tax system (DET) and the Flat Tax Rate system 
(FTR), as the other models of integrated systems are already examined in our previous articles. 
2. Altering the basic methodological frame  
We already mentioned, preferably, that the measurements should be expressed at marginal level, because the focus 
of this research is put on the allocation criteria. Here, the main purpose is to examine the investment decision in 
the case of integrated implementation of both, the corporate and the personal taxes. For that reason, the basic 
methodology of effective marginal tax rate (EMTR), has to be modified once again, because of its capabilities to 
capture the integrated effect from these taxes.  
To recall, according to Devereux & Griffith [1], [2], [3], the effective marginal tax rate is defined as: 
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In order to isolate the pure effects, that arise from the imposition of the code, as well as to simplify the calculation 
for the purpose of a better illustration of the effects, once again, we suggest the following assumptions: the net-
present value of depreciation allowances is assumed 0 (A = 0), there is no inflation in the economy (π = 0, ρ = r), 
the rate of economic depreciation is assumed 0 (δ = 0) and the real interest rate is positive (r > 0). If we consider 
the previous assumptions and label md as the personal tax rate on dividend income, z as the effective personal tax 
rate on capital gains, mi as the personal tax rate on interest income and c as the tax credit rate allowed for dividends 
paid, and then the tax discrimination variable requires the form of: 
 
)1)(1(
)1(
cz
md


           (2)
  
 
The shareholder’s discount rate transforms to: 
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And the general form of cost of capital rearranges to: 
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Recognizing the fact that under existence of personal taxes, the financial constraints variable FNE when the project 
is financed with new equities is measured as: 
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Derives a cost of capital for this alternative investment of: 
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While under the same conditions, the financial constraints variable FDE when the project is financed with debt: 
 
)1(
)]1([





tr
F DE          (7)
 
 
Generates a cost of capital for the debt-financed investment of: 
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Before we proceed, we would like to refer to our main analytical tool, and that is, the investment tax wedge 
coefficient defined as (p~ – r).  Depending on the relation between the cost of capital p~ and the real interest rate 
r, we can distinct three different conditions. The first condition is when the effective tax burden is positive (p~> 
r) and because of that, the tax system depresses the investment activities. In terms of integrated taxation of 
company‘s income, this means that both, the economic rent and the normal return are effectively taxed. The second 
condition is when the effective tax burden is equal to 0 (p~ = r), when the tax system is neutral to the investment 
decision. In other words, under these conditions, the normal return of corporate profit is left from taxation and 
only the extra profit is being subject to taxation. In addition, the third and the most preferable condition from the 
investor’s point of view is when the effective tax burden is negative (p~< r), when the tax system supports the 
overall investment. Here, the investment is being effectively „subsidized“by the system, enabling the investor to 
legally escape from taxation a rate of return higher than the normal rate of return. In perfect economies without 
presence of taxes, the cost of capital is identical with the real interest rate (p~= r) and the economic agents are 
completely indifferent between the investment decision and the decision to save. Normally, the existence of 
national tax system diverges the difference between the cost of capital and the interest rate and therefore creates 
a positive tax wedge (p~> r). 
3. Recalling the classical corporation tax system (CCT) 
Before we move on with the analysis, we would like to recall once again briefly, to the so-called „classical“ 
approach in corporate taxation, which has been traditionally the most used and widely practiced form of corporate 
tax. As stated before, the classical system posts a true representation of what is known as „double“ taxation and a 
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classical example of pure separate taxation of corporate income. We remember to it because it serves as a baseline 
model for comparison of the integrated tax systems discussed later in the paper. 
Actually, the CCT is a rudimentary form of corporate tax that treats the corporate income in a conservative and 
fundamental way. It is a taxing system of companies in which the company is treated as a taxable entity, separate 
from its own shareholders. The profits of companies under this system are therefore taxed twice, first when made 
by the company and again when distributed to the shareholders as dividends and capital gains. Formally, there is 
no integration at all between the corporate and personal income tax under the CCT system. In the essence of the 
Classical Corporation Tax is double taxation of corporate income. Such a tax system discriminates against the 
incorporation of business ideas, restrains the supply of equity finance necessary for their economic utilization, 
reallocates resources from the corporate sector to the unincorporated one and thus causes an efficiency loss to the 
whole economy [4]. The need to eliminate these drawbacks led to tax reforms aimed at integrating the taxation of 
corporations and their owners [5]. So, how could we express the true nature of this typical form of corporate tax 
and illustrate the effects from it in terms of the proposed methodology? 
Technically speaking “A Classical System makes no allowance for “double” taxation, so that dividend income is 
subject to corporate income tax and taxed again as personal income” [6].  The authorities impose the corporate 
tax at the corporate level differently from the personal taxes at the stockholder level and at the same time do not 
allow any tax credit on dividend distributions (c = 0). Usually, the combination of the levels (percentage points) 
of the different tax rates falls under discretion of the policy maker. Considering this, we can identify the CCT 
system as (t, md, mi, z, c = 0). 
3.1. CCT in debt-financed alternatives  
It is easily recognized that the CCT produces a zero investment tax wedge if we take in account expression (8) 
that the cost of capital in this alternative is equal to the real interest rate: 
0~  rrrp           (9)
  
A conclusion is drawn that, if the overall integrated effect from the corporate and the personal tax is observed, in 
every case when the investment project is financed with external debt, the system will be neutral to the investment 
decision, ceteris paribus. The introduction of personal taxes do not affect these investments in a different way 
rather than the case of isolated application of the corporate tax, so it is evident that the „double“ taxation effect is 
not present here. 
3.2. CCT in debt-financed alternatives  
The implications of the conditions of classical system in this alternative is initially found in parameters γ and ρ: 
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Finally, the investment tax wedge will transform to: 
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Accordingly, as stated in this case by Gruevski [7], “The effects from corporate taxation very often depend on the 
cross-effects from the personal taxation”. Expression (12) shows that the investment decision in this basic and 
most extended version of taxation of corporate income is determined largely from the inter-relation between the 
different personal tax rates (mi and md) and the corporate tax rate t. It is also self-evident, as we can see from the 
absence of symbol z, that the effective personal tax rate on capital income is no relevant for the present model of 
taxation. The effect from „double“ taxation is quantified with the term (1 – mi)/(1 – t)(1 – md). Actually, it 
represents the combined corporate and personal income tax liability of the CCT, which may have variable values 
depending on different dimensions of the relevant tax rates imposed by the code. For example, if we take the 
actual situation in Macedonia, where mi = 0% (0,00), md= 10% (0,10) and t = 10% (0,10), the combined tax 
liability would be 0,2345 or 23,34% and with real interest rate of 10% (0,10) would yield an effective tax rate on 
investment of 0,0234 or 2,34%. If we assume that an interest income tax of 5% has been introduced lately mi = 
5% (0,05), than the combined tax liability would be 0,1728 or 17,28%, producing an effective tax rate on 
investment of 0,0172 or 1,72%. On the other hand, if the corporate and the dividend tax are increased on 20% t = 
md= 20% (0,20) and mi= 0% (0,00), it is obvious that the investment tax wedge will additionally increase even on 
0,0562 or 5,62%. In the following table, some possible combinations of the relevant tax rates and outcomes are 
presented and interpreted in terms of the investment tax wedge coefficient. 
Of course, the Classical System of Corporation Tax could produce in theory some favorable outcomes, despite its 
infamous reputation. As we can see from Table 1, an increase in corporate and dividend tax will generally 
increase liabilities and the burden on investment, while an increase in interest income tax will decrease tax 
obligations and vice versa. If the combined liability of the corporate and the dividend tax from the denominator 
is higher than the interest tax liability from the nominator, the investment tax wedge will be positive, with limiting, 
distortive effects on the equity-financed investment. If this combined liability is equal to the interest tax liability, 
regardless the level of tax rates, the system will be neutral and indifferent concerning the investment decision. A 
positive burden can occur even when the relevant tax rates are identical (t = md = mi), a situation which is else 
known as „Flat Tax Rate system“ (see Raw 2 from Table 1). In addition, in the third option, every time when the 
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combined liability is lesser than the nominator, with no respect to the level of tax rates, the system will create 
favorable conditions, stimulating the equity-financed investments trough subsidization of the normal rate of the 
return. Usually, the authorities avoid the last condition in order to escape any additional refunds. The circumstance 
that sustains a positive tax burden actually represents a reflection of what is known as a true CCT system. 
Therefore, the Classical Corporation Tax assumes a positive (non-zero) tax rates with a corporate income and a 
dividend income tax equal or higher than the interest income tax and a right to the company to deduct the interest 
payments from its corporate income tax base. 
Table 1: Illustration of the possible combinations of tax rates and their effects on investment under the CCT 
system 
Possible 
combination 
of tax rates 
Example Investmen
t tax 
wedge 
 (p~-r) 
Effects on 
equity –
financed 
investment 
Effects on 
normal 
return and 
economic 
rent 
Effects on 
corporate 
finance 
Effects on 
efficiency 
(allocation 
criteria) 
t = md = mi 10%,10%,10% 1,11% limiting normal 
return and 
rent  taxed 
favors debt distortive 
t  > md = mi 20%,10%,10% 2,50% limiting normal 
return and 
rent  taxed 
favors debt distortive 
t  > md> mi 30%,20%,10% 6,07% limiting normal 
return and 
rent  taxed 
favors debt distortive 
t  > md< mi 20%,10%,28% 0,00% indifferent rent taxed 
only 
indifferent neutral 
t > md< mi 10%,  5%,30% -1,81% stimulating subsidized favors 
equity 
distortive 
t = md> mi 20%,20%, 10% 4,06% limiting normal 
return and 
rent  taxed 
favors debt distortive 
t = md< mi 10%,10%,19% 0,00% indifferent rent taxed 
only 
indifferent neutral 
t = md< mi 10%,10%,30% -1,36% stimulating subsidized favors 
equity 
distortive 
t = md = 0,mi 0%, 0%, 10% -1,00% stimulating subsidized favors 
equity 
distortive 
t = md, mi= 0 10%,10%, 0% 2,34% limiting normal 
return and 
rent  taxed 
favors debt distortive 
t = mi, md= 0 10%,10%, 0% 0,00% indifferent rent taxed 
only 
indifferent neutral 
t = 0, mi=md 0%,10%, 10% 0,00% indifferent rent taxed 
only 
indifferent neutral 
t = md=mi= 0 0%,  0%,  0% 0,00% indifferent rent taxed 
only 
indifferent neutral 
Source: Author’s calculations and interpretations 
We may conclude that the CCT, as we know it, produces in total, the highest amount of taxes paid on a single unit 
of corporate profit, entails double taxation, and possess a large distortive potential on corporate finance. However, 
as mentioned, only if the interest payments are being continuously deductible from the tax base and the tax rates 
met with the appropriate specifications. Under the conditions of Classical System, the normal return and the extra 
profit at its source and its destination are effectively streamed by the means of taxing regime. However, if we put 
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aside these limitations, certain advantages open some new frontiers and possibilities for the CCT. For instance, 
the incorporated principle of CCT for separate and independent taxation of company’s income enables the 
corporate tax from the first stage to act as a withholding barrier for the personal taxes imposed in the second stage. 
Another positive attribution is the simple tax structure. The CCT’s in-build simplicity without any complex rules 
for exempting flow-troughs of capital income raised the idea for the Classical Corporation Tax as a global mean 
of tax harmonization in an international context. These present only a handful of the positive features of CCT 
acknowledged from the literature [8]. 
4. Full integration tax system (FIT) 
Sometimes, in order to alleviate the corporate’s tax burden to some extent, the tax authorities might allow a tax 
credit on dividend distributions at the personal (shareholder) level in amount of the liabilities paid at corporate 
level (c = t). The repercussions from this measure, which is called with other words „Full Imputation (Integration) 
Tax system - FIT“, to variables γ and ρ are the following: 
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to the cost of capital: 
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and to the investment tax wedge: 
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As we can see from the absence of symbol t above, with this approach we have managed to neutralize the effect 
from the corporate income tax in whole. The corporation acts as a pass through entity and all the corporate profits 
are allocated at shareholder level, where it is subject to taxation under the personal income tax. The system 
produces preferences that depend in general only from the personal taxes involved in this particular model of 
taxation: the personal tax rate on dividend income md and the personal tax rate on interest income mi. Note that if 
md= mi, than the tax burden is zero, equalizing the tax treatment between debt and new equity issues. There is 
even an extreme case of negative tax burden, only possible if md<mi, turning the table in favor of this finance 
compared to debt, which is traditionally thought as the most tax favorable source of finance. 
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In practice, Macedonia experienced this model of corporate taxation until the end of 2006, when a priority was 
given to the development of the stock market, supported with adequate tax measures. Companies were 
“encouraged” to participate in the market with implementation of the imputation corporate tax system. In fact, the 
Macedonian model was not a FIT system, but rather a Partly Integrated Tax system (PIT). A partial tax credit on 
dividend distributions in amount of 50% of the corporate income tax liability was allowed to the entitled 
companies for stimulation of the stock exchange. For example, the factual tax rates mi = 0% (0,00) and md= 10% 
(0,10) under the conditions of the former PIT system would produce a tax liability of 0,1696 (1 – mi)/(1 – c)(1 – 
md) = (1 – 0)/(1 – 0,05)(1 – 0,10) or 16,96%, and with interest rate of 10% an effective tax rate of 0,0169 (1,69%). 
For comparison, if we assume the propositions of the FIT instead of the PIT system, and implement the same 
rates, the results show that the difference in the burden is apparently evident: tax liability of 11,11% and an 
investment tax wedge of 1,11%. If the goal is to achieve neutrality in taxation, the Macedonian authorities should 
set identical personal income tax rates (mi = md). Therefore, if mi = 10% (0,10) and md= 10% (0,10), that would 
result with zero percent (0%) tax liability and zero percent tax wedge, which is completely identical with the 
scenario of the debt financed investment. 
 
Table 2: Illustration of the possible effects of FIT on investment 
FIT variants Example Invest-
ment 
tax 
wedge 
 (p~ - r) 
Effects on 
equity –
financed 
invest-
ment 
Effects on 
normal 
return and 
economic 
rent 
Effects on 
corporate 
finance 
Effects on 
efficiency 
(allocation 
criteria) 
t, mi = md, c = t 10%, 10%, 10% 0,00% indifferent rent tax only indifferen
t 
neutral 
t, mi  > md, c = t 10%, 20%, 10% -1,11% stimulating subsidized favors 
equity 
distortive 
t, mi < md,  c = t 10%, 10%,  
20% 
1,25% limiting normal 
return and 
rent  taxed  
favors 
debt 
distortive 
Source: Author’s calculations and interpretations 
5. Dividend exemption tax system (DET) 
Another famous measure used for alleviation of the corporate tax burden for investments financed with external 
equity is the so-called „Dividend Exemption Tax system - DET“. A similar form, proposed by Cnossen [9], is the 
dividend deduction tax system (the dividend relief system) which incorporates certain deductions on the 
company’s or alternatively, the shareholder’s capital income tax base. In our case, rather than deduction, the relief 
is more in a form of exemption exclusively on the shareholder’s capital income tax base. Technically speaking, 
with this measure tax authorities actually allow a full exemption from personal tax on the received dividend 
income by every shareholder in the corporation (md = 0). 
5.1. DET system with no tax credit available (c = 0) 
First we will analyze the scenario of the dividend exemption system if there is no additional tax credit available 
(c = 0). If the conditions are as mentioned, than the implications for γ and ρ are the following: 
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for the cost of capital from term (11), the implications are: 
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and for the investment tax wedge (expression 11): 
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The result from term (18), explains that in case of investment covered with new equity issues, the dividend 
exemption system creates a wedge that mostly depends from the relation of the corporate tax rate t and the personal 
tax rate on interest income mi. Differently to the FIT, this system effectively removes the effect from the personal 
tax on dividend income in general, rather than the effect from the corporate income tax (residence based tax). 
Similarly, three (three) conditions can be identified here: first, the condition of positive taxation on corporate 
income when t >mi (favors debt source investment); second, the condition of a neutral taxation when t = mi 
(equalizes the treatment between debt and equity); and third, the condition of negative burden on corporate income 
when t <mi (which favors equity source investment). As we can see, to achieve neutrality, this system demands 
equalization of the corporate income tax rate and the personal tax rate on interest income. 
 
Table 3: Illustration of the possible effects of DET (with no tax credit available) on investment 
DET variants Example Invest-
ment 
tax 
wedge 
 (p~ - r) 
Effects on 
equity –
financed 
invest-
ment 
Effects on 
normal 
return and 
economic 
rent 
Effects on 
corporate 
finance 
Effects on 
efficiency 
(allocation 
criteria) 
t = mi, md = 0, c = 0 10%, 10%, 0% 0,00% indifferent rent tax only indifferen
t 
neutral 
t > mi, md = 0, c = 0 20%, 10%, 0% 1,25% limiting normal 
return and 
rent  taxed 
favors 
debt 
distortive 
t < mi, md = 0,  c = 0 10%, 20%, 0% -1,11% stimulating subsidized favors 
equity 
distortive 
Source: Author’s calculations and interpretations 
Let’s incorporate the previous model fictionary on the domestic tax parameters mi = 0% (0,00) and md= 10% 
(0,10). The implementation of the DET system would have produced tax liability of 0,1111(1 – mi)/(1 – t) = (1 – 
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0)/(1 – 0,10) or 11,11%, and with interest rate of 10% an effective tax rate of 0,0111 (1,11%). According to this, 
the effect from this system is similar to the effect from the FIT system, but only coincidently because the corporate 
income tax rate t is the same as the dividend income tax rate md. If they were different, say t = 20% (0,20) and 
md= 10% (0,10), the effect from the FIT would not change, but the effect from the DET system would be 
significantly different generating tax liability of 0,25 (1 – mi)/(1 – t) = (1 – 0)/(1 – 0,20) or 25%, and an effective 
tax rate of 0,025 (2,5%). 
5.2. DET system with tax credit available (c = t) 
In this section, we investigate the effect from the implementation of the DET system with a tax credit available 
on dividend distributions. This model represents an extreme form of integrated taxation where both of the effects 
created by the corporate tax and the dividend tax directly cancel each other, creating a negative tax wedge on the 
capital income. If these assumptions are met, than variables γ and ρ will become: 
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the cost of capital from term (19) will transform to: 
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and the investment tax wedge from expression [22]: 
 
iii rmrrmrrrmrp  )1(~       (21) 
 
The negative prefix from expression (21), clearly demonstrates that this combination generates strong incentives 
for the investments covered with equities, but only in presence of positive tax rate on interest income. If this 
condition is satisfied, as in the case of many countries, the “tax subsidization” is proportional to the multiplied 
value of the real interest rate r and the personal tax rate on interest income mi, automatically creating advantages 
to new equity in front of debt. But if the national code does not incorporate a personal tax rate paid on interest 
income, such as in the case of Macedonia, than the described effect of tax subsidization will diminish, and the 
system will remain neutral between the alternative sources of finance (mi = 0, r = 0,10 and p~ - r = -0,10 x 0,00 
= 0). 
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Table 4: Illustration of the possible effects of DET (with tax credit available) on investment 
DET variants Example Invest-
ment 
tax 
wedge 
 (p~ - r) 
Effects on 
equity –
financed 
invest-
ment 
Effects on 
normal 
return and 
economic 
rent 
Effects on 
corporate 
finance 
Effects on 
efficiency 
(allocation 
criteria) 
t, mi, md = 0, c = t 10%, 10%, 0% -1,00% stimulating subsidized favors 
equity 
distortive 
t, mi = 0, md= 0, c = t 10%, 0%, 0% 0,00% indifferent rent taxed 
only 
indifferen
t 
neutral 
Source: Author’s calculations and interpretations 
6. Flat Tax Rate System (FTR) 
The next variant of integrated taxation offers another intresting feature for neutralization of the effects from 
„double“ taxation. It is the so-called Flat Tax Rate system - FTR, which requires implementation of „flat“, 
proportional tax rates on the corporate income and the personal income tax base (mi = md = z = t). 
6.1. FTR system with no tax credit available (c = 0) 
First, the model of flat tax rate system without a tax credit is presented, whose conditions require for the variables 
γ and ρ to obtain values of: 
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the cost of capital p~ value of: 
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and the investment tax wedge p~ – r value of: 
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As it is seen from our previous articles, the result of this calculation is the same as the one for the CBIT system 
with no tax credit available, but only arbitraged against the form of this expression, not actually against the 
ultimate effect on the investment. Namely, the system of CBIT assumes that the interest rate is not deductible 
from the tax base when the investment is financed with debt, on the contrary of the FTR system, which means 
that in essence, their overall allocation criteria is different as presented in the tables bellow. 
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Table 5: Illustration of the possible effects of FTR (without tax credit available) on investment 
FTR 
Variant 
Example Invest-
ment 
tax 
wedge 
 (p~ - r) 
Effects on 
equity –
financed 
invest-
ment 
Effects on 
normal 
return and 
economic 
rent 
Effects on 
corporate 
finance 
Effects on 
efficiency 
(allocation 
criteria) 
t = mi = md, c = 0 10%, 10%, 10% 1,11% limiting normal 
return and 
rent  taxed 
favors 
debt 
distortive 
Source: Author’s calculations and interpretations 
Table 6: Illustration of the possible effects of CBIT (with no tax credit available) on investment 
CBIT 
Variants 
Example Invest-
ment 
tax 
wedge 
 (p~ - r) 
Effects on 
equity –
financed 
invest-
ment 
Effects on 
normal 
return and 
economic 
rent 
Effects on 
corporate 
finance 
Effects on 
efficiency 
(allocation 
criteria) 
t, mi = 0, md = 0, c = 0 10%, 0%, 0% 1,11% limiting normal 
return and 
rent  taxed 
indifferen
t 
neutral 
t, mi = md≠ 0, c = 0 10%, 20%, 20% 1,11% limiting normal 
return and 
rent  taxed 
indifferen
t 
neutral 
Source: Author’s calculations and interpretations 
6.2. FTR system with tax credit available (c = t) 
The same conclusion can be drawn for the next variant, as well, but from the view of the urge for equalization of 
the different treatments. Again, it is about the Flat Tax Rate system, but with available tax credit on dividend 
distributions. The implications of this variant on the tax discrimination variable γ and the shareholders discount 
rate ρ are the following: 
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to the cost of capital p~: 
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Finally, to the investment tax wedge p~ – r: 
 
0~  rrrp           (27) 
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We immediately recognize similarity between this result and the one from the CBIT system with a tax credit 
available, but the effects on corporate finance and the allocation criteria are quite distinctive. Since under these 
conditions the value of investment tax wedge is zero, the excess of the corporate tax burden in this financial 
alternative is effectively eliminated, creating indifferent position for investment and saving, just the same as in 
the case of debt financed investment. To conclude, if the imperative is neutrality, then the condition of c = t must 
be fully respected for the purpose within the FTR system.  
At the end of this section, we would like to clear some confusing facts concerning the FTR system. Namely, from 
the previous we noticed that the basic model of this system creates a positive wedge on a unit of taxable profit, 
which means that fundamentally, it is not a “perfectly“ neutral tax model. We also said that to respect the principle 
of neutrality, the condition of c = t had to be satisfied. Following this, we could easily conclude that on the 
contrary, the FTR system is not actually „flat“ or „neutral“ as it seems. Truthfully, the expression „flat“ is 
synonymous terminology widely excepted by the public that refers not to the concept of „neutrality“, but to 
concept of „equality“ or „proportionality“ among the different tax rates.  
In the following tables, for a better illustration, we summarize the derived effects from taxation on investment 
performance according to the observed FRT and CBIT models. 
Table 7: Illustration of the possible effects of FTR (with tax credit available) on investment 
FTR 
Variant 
Example Invest-
ment 
tax 
wedge 
 (p~ - r) 
Effects on 
equity –
financed 
invest-
ment 
Effects on 
normal 
return and 
economic 
rent 
Effects on 
corporate 
finance 
Effects on 
efficiency 
(allocation 
criteria) 
t = mi = md, c = t 10%, 10%, 10% 0,00% indifferent  rent  taxed 
only 
indifferen
t 
neutral 
Source: Author’s calculations and interpretations 
 
Table 8: Illustration of the possible effects of CBIT (with tax credit available) on investment 
CBIT 
Variants 
Example Invest-
ment 
tax 
wedge 
 (p~ - r) 
Effects on 
equity –
financed 
invest-
ment 
Effects on 
normal 
return and 
economic 
rent 
Effects on 
corporate 
finance 
Effects on 
efficiency 
(allocation 
criteria) 
t, mi = 0, md = 0, c = t 10%, 0%,  0% 0,00% indifferent rent  taxed 
only 
favors 
equity 
distortive 
Source: Author’s calculations and interpretations 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
At the finishing point, the effects from taxation on investment performance are summarized in Table 9, and the 
qualitative attributions of the analyzed basic models are given in Table 10. 
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Table 9: Summary of the effects from taxation on investment performance 
Classical Corporation Income Tax System (CCT)  
Debt 
0
 
New equity issues: (t, mi, md, z, c = 0) 

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Full Integration tax System (FIT)  
Debt 0 
New equity issues: (t, mi, md, c = t) 
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
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
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Dividend Exemption Tax System (DET) 
 
Debt 
0 
New equity issues: Basic model, without tax credit available (t, 
mi, md = 0, c = 0) 








1
)1(
)1(
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New equity issues: Model of DET with tax credit available (t, 
mi, md = 0, c = t) 
irm
 
Flat Tax Rate System (FTR)  
Debt 0 
New equity issues: Basic model, without tax credit available (t 
= mi = md, c = 0) 
)1( t
rt

 
New equity issues: Model of FRT with tax credit available (t = 
mi = md, c = t) 
0 
Source: Summary and review of author’s calculations 
 
Table 10: Summary of the qualitative attributions of basic tax models (aspect of taxation of new equity issues) 
Basic 
model of 
tax 
system 
Effects on 
debt  
finance 
Effects on 
new equity 
finance 
Effects 
on 
econo-
mic rent 
Effects 
on 
normal 
return 
Withhold-
ing function 
criteria 
Location 
 specific 
criteria 
Overall 
allocation  
criteria 
 
 (CCT) 
 
favors 
( in general) 
 
discriminates 
(in general) 
 
Taxed 
 
taxed 
withholds 
rents and 
normal 
return 
source & 
resi-
dence-
based 
 
distortive 
 
(CBIT) 
 
neutral 
(predominan
-tly) 
 
neutral 
(predominan-
tly) 
 
Taxed 
 
taxed 
no 
withholding 
function at 
all 
 
source- 
based 
 
neutral 
(FIT) discriminate
s or neutral 
 (in most 
cases) 
 
favors or 
neutral 
(in most cases) 
Taxed exempt withholds 
rents 
residen-
ce based 
distortive 
(DET) discriminate
s or neutral 
(mostly) 
favors or 
neutral 
(mostly) 
Taxed exempt withholds 
rents 
source 
and resi-
dence 
based 
distortive 
(FTR) favors 
(predominan
-tly) 
 
discriminates 
(predominan-
tly) 
Taxed taxed withholds 
rents and 
normal 
return 
source 
and resi-
dence 
based 
distortive 
Source: Author’s interpretations 
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